

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

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TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
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5	DDI		X		
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9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL		X		
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	C/ACIS/DI		X		
18	D/SOVA/DI		X		
19	NIO/USSR		X		
20	NIO/SP		X		
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Remarks

Executive Secretary
7 OCT 86

Date

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Executive Registry

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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

September 29, 1986

Dear Mr. President:

I did not support Sen. Stevens' recent effort to link a higher SDI funding level to arms control negotiations. This is another sign that support for the highest SDI funding level is eroding, even among original conservative SDI advocates. Enclosed is a recent letter from Senate Steering Committee colleagues arguing that it is precisely the close linkage of SDI to arms control that is preventing the necessary acceleration of near term SDI deployment options. In my view, near term testing and deployment options for SDI (and also conventional point defense of MX) are being delayed by the Administration. The delay is intended to appease Congressional opponents of SDI, who are themselves anxious to appease the Russians in negotiations and with continued US compliance with an ABM Treaty the Soviets are violating.

My recent request to you for access to the 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement negotiating record was denied, while at the same time the Administration sent to the Senate the integrally linked negotiating record for the SALT I ABM Treaty, at the request of Democratic Senators opposed to near term deployment of SDI. Perhaps I shouldn't mind being refused when Democrats are being satisfied. Fortunately, the real key to testing and deploying an SDI in the near term lies not in trying to interpret the finer points of the 17 year old negotiating record to discern a "restrictive" versus a "broader" compliance policy, but in correctly perceiving current facts.

Instead, the Soviet Krasnoyarsk ABM radar, Soviet deployment of a nationwide ABM defense, and their own highly advanced SDI, are the key to the debate over the "restrictive" versus the "broader" US compliance policy with the ABM Treaty, or indeed to any US ABM Treaty compliance at all. Because while the US is trying to fine tune our compliance policy, the Soviets have broken out of SALT I and II.

Your approach to SDI and the ABM Treaty is, in my opinion, weak and inconsistent, on at least three points. First, your SDI policy is supposed to shift emphasis to testing components for a near term SDI deployment architecture in the event that political support for your highest SDI funding request erodes. This is precisely what your own NSDD-192 and the current unclassified Arms Control Impact Statement say:

"...The President determined that as long as the [SDI] program receives the support needed to implement its [long term research] plan, it is not necessary to restructure the SDI program toward the boundaries of [ABM] Treaty interpretation which the US could observe [in order to conduct tests of near term deployment options]."

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But the erosion of support for long term research on SDI is clear in recent votes. Over \$1 billion has been cut already from your SDI request, and 1 vote margins sustain the current reduced level. The purpose of this policy shift called for in NSDD-192 is to rebuild political support for higher SDI funding by demonstrating through tests tangible progress toward near term SDI deployment. These tests would require either the US "broader" interpretation or abrogation of the ABM Treaty. Thus under your own declared policy, SDI should now be immediately restructured toward accelerated near term deployment.

Instead of delaying:

1. the Airborne Optical Adjunct;
2. the Acquisition-Tracking-Pointing tests;
3. the Space Surveillance and Tracking System;
4. the Neutral Particle Beam tests;
5. the Spaced-based Kinetic Kill Vehicle tests;
6. and the Free Electron Laser tests with the spaced-based mirror;

these tests of near term deployment options should be accelerated as our highest priorities for funding and accomplishment. Achievement of these near term deployment option tests successfully would help rebuild political support for the inevitably higher funding needed for near term SDI deployment in anycase. (Moreover, we should immediately deploy land-based, conventional terminal or point ABM defenses for MX.)

Second, I have been reliably informed that in addition to unwisely proposing to Gorbachev that the US extend ABM Treaty compliance for 7 years, the US has been giving in to the Russians in negotiations. In various arms control negotiating arenas in Geneva the US is now allowing the Soviet Union to dictate to the US how to interpret the ABM Treaty restrictively, in Soviet interests. The Soviets have reportedly insisted that each of the above 6 near term option test programs would violate the ABM Treaty, and the US has acquiesced to the Soviet position by delaying each of them. It is only because of this Soviet insistence upon the US "restrictive" interpretation that these US near term option tests are being deliberately delayed.

In contrast, Soviet Marshal Grechko stated as long ago as 1972 that the ABM Treaty posed absolutely no obstacles to the Soviet SDI program, and the Soviets had already reached a decision at the very time they signed the ABM Treaty to break out of the Treaty. This decision was evidenced by the appearance beginning immediately after 1972 of the inter-netted Krasnoyarsk-Pechora class of now 8 ABM Battle Management radars (including two more of these huge new radars only recently discovered), and their nearly completed nationwide ABM defense using four types of mobile interceptors all currently in mass production.

Third, Mr. President, you should not condone Soviet SALT violations, as you did when you stated to the United Nations General Assembly on September 22, 1986, that:


"The United States continues to respect the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, in spite of clear evidence that the Soviets are violating it. We have told the Soviets that if we can both agree on radical reductions in strategic offensive weapons, we are prepared--right now--to sign an agreement with them on research, development, testing, and deployment of strategic defenses..."

You did not mention the need for the Soviets to reverse their SALT violations. By not explicitly demanding that the Soviets reverse all of their SALT violations, you in effect condoned them. How could you ever sign a new strategic arms treaty with the Soviets "right now" unless they reverse their 'clear violations' of the ABM Treaty? To do so would even more clearly condone the Soviet SALT violations, and I must warn you that any such new treaty would not stand a chance of gaining the support of two thirds of the Senate.

Mr. President, this failure to restructure our SDI for near term deployment, and this failure to resist the Russian insistence on our "restrictive" interpretation of the ABM Treaty, are both contrary to your own expressed policies. You have also stated in NSDD-192 that the "broader" interpretation of the ABM Treaty is "fully justifiable." If so, then you should invoke it.

But I believe that neither the "restrictive" nor even the "broader" interpretation of the ABM Treaty is in the US national security interest. Indeed, continued US compliance with the violated SALT I ABM Treaty is not in the US national security interest. In sum, I will continue to look for ways to work with the Administration in order to accelerate SDI testing for deployment in the near term, but I can not patiently abide appeasement for too much longer. Should the US continue to waste billions of dollars on research for long term deployment options, only because we are afraid of Russian opposition to US efforts aimed at providing for our own national security in the near term? The implications of such a policy are that we are already allowing the Russians to influence our national security posture against our own best interests. The longer this persists, the more difficult it will be to safeguard our supreme national interests.

Sincerely,



United States Senator

Enclosure: Senate Steering Committee Letter on SDI

Copies to:

Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense,
Chairman JCS,
Director CIA,
Director ACDA,
President's National Security Advisor

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 7, 1986

The Honorable John Poindexter
National Security Adviser to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear John:

Unfortunately, SDI was one vote short of a disaster twice this week. We are considering joining the opponents of SDI if it becomes necessary.

We have been hearing for some time that the testing program of SDI has been altered substantially to conform with the so-called restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty, thereby delaying eventual deployment five years or more and deferring a decision to deploy to the 1990s.

There has been no consultation on this with the President's supporters of SDI. Nor has the request by Senator Nunn for access to the ABM Treaty negotiating record resulted in offers to also brief conservative Senators concerned about the issue of SDI tests.

Let us list for you the specific cases in point:

1. The Airborne Optical Adjunct has been delayed until 1989. This crucial program should have been flying this year, according to some observers who doubt that cost overruns were the real cause for the postponement.
2. The Acquisition, Tracking and Pointing tests from the space shuttle had been postponed to 1988 or later even before the Challenger disaster.
3. The Space Surveillance and Tracking System has been delayed until at least 1990.
4. The Neutral Particle Beam tests for interactive discrimination have been delayed until 1989--on the bizarre concept that such a system would constitute "radar," thereby violating the ABM Treaty's Article 2.
5. The Space-based Kinetic Kill Vehicle experiments against ASAT have been postponed until the early 1990s--supposedly as a concession to Article 6 of the Treaty as well as Article 5.
6. The highly promising Free Electron Laser experiments to bounce the laser from White Sands to a space-based combat mirror has been delayed after lobbying by the opponents of SDI.

John, we doubt that the President appreciates yet that the two recent votes on the SDI depended on his supporters in a one vote margin.


Groups like the National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty have been eroding support for SDI in Congress. Any efforts by the SDI organization to placate such groups by hobbling the SDI research schedule have become known through the work of the SDI's opponents. These rumors are devastating the President's supporters.

Worse still, John, has been the Washington Post's Sunday headline story about the President's letter to Gorbachev. If accurate, this story has also undermined the support of conservatives for SDI.

We don't mind being taken for granted. We support the President's dream of SDI. What is going to happen, however, if the critics of SDI continue much longer to restrain the research and testing to the restrictive (and false) interpretation of the ABM Treaty, we are going to cease supporting a doomed dream and re-target our deficit reduction activities on SDI.

Please let us hear from you soon about assurances that the programs described are scheduled as soon as realistically possible. We doubt it, and will want to verify the facts personally. We are not alone among our colleagues in this concern.

Sincerely,

The block contains two handwritten signatures. The signature on the left is 'John D. Bunker' written in a cursive, flowing script. The signature on the right is 'Craig Hatch' written in a similar cursive style, with a large, sweeping flourish extending from the end of the name.